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Friend or Foe? Attitudes Towards Immigration  
from Other European Union Countries
Justyna Salamońska
Over the decades Europe has become a destination for different groups of migrants, including mobile 
citizens from the European Union Member States. At the same time European citizens have become 
more mobile with a growing number of cross-border practices connecting them to places and people 
abroad through migration, travel, social networks or consumption practices. The main contribution of 
this study is in analysing to what extent processes of Europeanization, at an individual and country 
level, matter for sentiments towards immigration. Data suggest that social globalization processes may 
produce a sense of threat, but individual transnationalism seems to provide a remedy against prejudice.
Introduction
European citizenship introduced with the Maastricht Treaty, brought with it 
the right to move freely and reside anywhere in the EU. Recently we observed 
how intra-EU migration has become a choice for many Central and Eastern 
Europeans following the EU accession, or Western Europeans who escape the 
recession-ridden Member States. And although intra-EU migration remains 
an experience taken up by only a minority of Europeans, European citizens 
increasingly cross the borders in other ways when travelling, consuming or 
connecting to others based abroad. This paper1 will address the question of 
whether these individual exchanges and interactions matter for how Europe-
ans feel about immigration originating from other EU Member States. Or, is 
it only a sense of threat that drives the attitudes towards immigrants during 
the economic crisis?
1  I would like to gratefully acknowledge generous funding from EUROLAB (GESIS). Many 
thanks go to the GESIS colleagues who took time to discuss this research during my EU-
ROLAB stay and 2015 Eurobarometer Symposium in Cologne, in particular Martin Fritz, 
Andrea Meckel, Ingvill C. Mochmann, Meinhard Moschner, Markus Quandt, Pascal Siegers 
and Malina Voicu.
SOCIETÀMUTAMENTOPOLITICA238
Empirically, the academic debate about attitudes towards immigration 
and immigrants, with some exceptions (Ceobanu and Escandell 2008, Kaya 
and Karakoç 2012, Meuleman et al. 2009), has been developed within West-
ern migration receiving contexts. Research on Western destinations largely 
examined attitudes towards immigration coming from non-Western origin 
countries, because this particular group was considered the most problematic 
for shaping outgroup attitudes. Theoretically, the studies were predominantly 
to be found in the framework of group threat or intergroup contact theories. 
These related, respectively, to the threat posed by foreigners and the ways in 
which negative attitudes can be reduced. Increasingly working with cross-
national datasets, these studies enhanced our understanding of how outgroup 
sentiments are determined on the micro and macro level. 
This paper will add to these literatures on the empirical and theoretical 
fronts. Firstly, there has been little research on attitudes towards migration 
from within the Western world, including intra-EU immigration. This paper 
will address this gap as it will examine attitudes towards immigration from 
within the EU, immigration which is usually considered to be rather ‘unprob-
lematic’. This is a valid research topic considering how, in recent decades, the 
numbers of Europeans on the move rose, due particularly to the new acces-
sions of 2004 and 2007, and growing east to west mobility. More recently, due 
to the persistent economic recession in the EU, mobility levels from some of 
the crisis struck economies were on the rise (Recchi and Salamońska 2015). 
These two different waves of intra-EU migration greatly interested the public. 
In 2005 the ‘Polish plumber’ became a dark character in the debate pre-
ceding the EU Constitution referendum in France. He came to symbolise 
the threat of cheap Eastern European labour to Western Europe’s working 
classes. Fuelled by these fears the French rejected the EU Constitution in May 
2005. Now, with the economic crisis persisting in Europe, similar sentiments 
have become important across the English Channel. UKIP, standing strongly 
against European immigration, has implications for the general debate on 
immigration in the UK.
Secondly, theoretically this paper will contribute to developing the litera-
ture on attitudes towards immigrants with the adaptation of the intergroup 
contact theory in the European context. Europeans are free to travel without 
visas and also without passports within the Schengen area. They are encour-
aged to study abroad, supported by the Erasmus programme. While shop-
ping online within the EU they are free from custom duties. Europeans also 
increasingly engage in interactions with residents based in other EU Member 
States. Thus currently we observe a plethora of cross-border exchanges on an 
individual level (Salamońska et al. 2013), which can be interpreted as a form of 
generalised contact with the other, which reduces the sense of threat posed by 
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immigration from other EU Member States. This paper will thus ask whether 
European cross-border practices result in more positive sentiments to immi-
gration originating from other EU member states. 
The paper aims to look, too, at attitudinal determinants on the micro and 
macro levels. The article builds on two main sets of theories typically applied 
to research on attitudes: group threat and intergroup contact theory which 
are outlined in the next section. In particular, the analysis extends our under-
standing of the intergroup contact framework in the European context. The 
use of Eurobarometer data and methods applied are outlined in the following 
section. Descriptive results are presented, followed by results and discussion 
of multilevel logistic modelling. Concluding remarks outline the limitations of 
this study and sketch some directions for future research. 
Theoretical framework
Attitudes towards immigration and immigrants were of interest to academics 
as far back as the 1950s, when some of the most influential theoretical frame-
works in this field were developed (Allport 1954, Blalock 1967, Blumer 1958). 
These early conceptualisations provided starting points to studies of prejudice 
stemming from individual characteristics, experiences and relations with the 
outgroup. At the time due to the unavailability of comparative cross-national 
data on perceived threats to in-group interests and privileges macro perspective 
(as opposed to individual ones) remained under-researched. It was only in the 
late 1980s that items regarding outgroup attitudes were introduced to cross-na-
tional surveys: these were initiated at that time, with first Eurobarometer, and 
then the International Social Survey Programme, the European Values Sur-
vey and the European Social Survey, among others. These all provided more 
measurement items and a better understanding of how attitudes are shaped in 
a cross-national context. In 1995 Quillian published a paper which for the first 
time provided a systematic cross-country comparison of prejudice in response 
to perceived group threats. Quillian tested group threat theory hypothesising 
that economic situation and size of outgroup relative to the in-group are the 
two determinants of a perceived threat at the country level. Much of the litera-
ture on attitudes towards immigrants and immigration followed the Quillian’s 
tests of group threat theory explaining how negative attitudes stem from the 
perceived threat of an economic or cultural nature. In addition, numerous au-
thors tested frameworks proposed by Allport (1954) pointing to how social in-
teractions with immigrants may reduce negative sentiments towards outgroup 
members. The following subsections examine in more detail the two strands of 
work in the context of attitudes towards intra-European migration.
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Why attitudes towards immigration and immigrants tend to be negative? Group 
threat theory
Group threat theory posits that negative attitudes towards outgroups are a 
function of competition over resources which leads to other groups feeling 
threatened (Blalock 1967). The object of the threat may be different, as group 
competition may be experienced in relation to access to material resources: 
these include jobs and well paid employment, but also services such as housing 
and the health system. A threat can also be experienced in relation to power 
and status. Threats are experienced at different levels. On the micro level, 
people may feel that their individual position, status, etc. are at risk. On the 
macro level, individual may experience a sense of threat directed at the group 
position, status and prerogatives, which may be endangered by the presence 
of an outgroup (Blumer 1958). 
Group threat theory does not assume that the threat actually exists: it may 
just be perceived to exist. Bobo highlights ‹‹subjectively appreciated threat and 
challenges to group status›› (Bobo 1983: 1196). This considerably expands our 
understanding, as we have to take into account not only individuals’ situation 
but the perception of their situation. 
According to group threat framework vulnerable individuals are most 
prone to express negative attitudes towards immigration. This includes the 
disadvantaged who are deprived, in material terms, but also those who as-
sess their (or their ingroup’s) material situation as negative. This leads to the 
formulation of the hypothesis 1A proposing that negative feelings towards 
EU immigration are more likely among more vulnerable groups: the unem-
ployed, persons negatively assessing their individual and country economic 
situation, the less educated). 
As Sides and Citrin point out (2007), beyond the threat to material well-
being, immigration may increase a sense of threat in relation to values and 
identities. Nation building has long been constructed as us against a real or 
imagined them. This is why immigrants and immigration may be perceived 
as a threat to cultural, ethnic or, indeed, the national homogeneity of a given 
society. This sense of threat may lead to hostility towards the outgroup. In 
line with reading the threat theory with regards to values and culture, in-
dividuals with strong national attachments should feel more challenged by 
outsiders. Outsiders threaten their values, but also more broadly the homo-
geneity of a whole society, leading to more negative feelings about outsiders 
(hypothesis 1B). 
Literature has also examined macro factors that contribute to more nega-
tive feelings towards immigrants and immigration. As Meuleman et al. (2009) 
highlight, the group threat on the macro level has been operationalised 
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through measures such as the economic conditions, including GDP level and 
unemployment, and the size of foreign population. Regarding the economic 
conditions literature has stressed how when the economic context is unfavour-
able resources are scarcer, and thus competition between in- and out-group 
becomes more pronounced during economic crises. This is a very relevant 
point for the analysis of attitudes which are reported during the prolonged 
crises affecting Europe. As the recession persists, competition over resources, 
like jobs, between the natives and immigrants may become more pronounced 
resulting in more negative attitudes (Gang et al. 2013). Curiously, not all exist-
ing research corroborates the hypothesis of unemployment being positively 
related to an increased sense of threat, with some studies finding that unem-
ployment has no effect or, surprisingly, even negative effects (Markaki and 
Longhi 2013, Rustenbach 2010). 
The size of the foreign population is another indicator which has been 
extensively examined as a determinant of outgroup feelings. According to the 
original conceptualisation by Blalock (1967) the larger the group the greater 
the perceived threat. However, the operationalisation of the outgroup dif-
fered by study. In the European context first comparative study of attitudes by 
Quillian (1995) included the size of national groups coming from outside the 
European Economic Community as an explanatory variable. The analyses 
measuring the impact of outgroup size largely followed this approach, includ-
ing the size of community in terms of foreign citizens coming from non-West-
ern countries. In turn Schneider (2008), in order to measure outgroup size, 
used a number of people with a different country of birth than the country of 
residence. She claimed this was a more comparable criterion.
Importantly, and as rightly pointed out by Schneider, a larger outgroup 
size does not necessarily have to increase the sense of threat. With more peo-
ple coming from other countries there is presumably more possibilities of con-
tact between in- and outgroups, which according to the contact theory, should 
lead to a reduction in negative sentiments (as originally outlined by Allport 
1954). Based on the literature reviewed above, it is thought that a negative as-
sessment of EU immigration is more likely in countries where economic com-
petition is more pronounced; in other terms, countries where GDP is lower, 
unemployment higher, and the EU migrant share higher (hypothesis 1C).
As outlined earlier, it is not only the economic situation of individuals that 
matters, be they good or bad, but also the way in which individuals perceive 
economic situation of their states. This is why analyses need to include a hy-
pothesis referring to individual subjective assessments in different economic 
contexts. It is thus expected that negative sentiments will be more pronounced 
among individuals concerned about the economic situation in vulnerable con-
texts (hypothesis 1D).
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While the above section examined the micro and macro factors that con-
tribute to a growing sense of threat among the natives, the following part will 
inspect the way in which positive attitudes are shaped on the individual and 
country levels. 
How can negative sentiments be reduced? Intergroup contact theory
While group threat theory endeavours to explain where hostility towards im-
migration comes from, contact theory seeks to understand how this threat 
sentiment can be reduced. Contact theory outlines how interactions of in-
group members with the ‘other’ can make sentiments towards foreign nation-
als more positive. In fact, much of the literature followed this line of research 
linking face-to-face interactions with foreigners at workplaces, schools and in 
the neighbourhoods.
Existing studies describe how contact between the in- and outgroup can 
be of different quality (positive/negative), quantity and facilitating context (or 
lack of it). According to Allport (1954) a distinction can usefully be made be-
tween casual, impersonal versus sustained, personal contact and it is the latter 
that should have the most effect on sentiments. 
However, this paper argues that the European context gives opportunities 
for different kinds of exchanges with fellow Europeans. European citizenship, 
introduced with the Maastricht Treaty and strengthened with the Lisbon 
Treaty (Maas 2007), is a tool for creating a European people. European citi-
zens are free to move within the EU in search of work, but also for education, 
self-development, to follow family or ‘ just because’ (Recchi and Favell 2009, 
Krings et al. 2013). Travel is becoming easier and easier, especially in the pass-
port free Schengen area and there is one currency in the Eurozone, also, fa-
cilitating movement. Europeans also travel virtually with most now accessing 
Internet on a daily basis. Social networks of Europeans often cross the nation 
state borders (Mau 2010). In addition, consumption practices cross borders 
as well, with more common online shopping or second property purchase 
among the wealthier (Wickham 2007). In all these forms, social transnation-
alism in Europe is argued to be a form of contact with the ‘other’ which is not 
only important per se, but because it has attitudinal consequences. 
Exchanges across borders have been argued to work as learning and trust 
building processes (Deutsch et al. 1957). Data from Germany illustrates how 
engagement in cross-border practices and transnational networks of family 
and friends result in more cosmopolitan attitudes (Mau et al. 2008). Similarly, 
in Europe greater transnationalism on the individual level results in less Eu-
roscepticism (Kuhn 2015). Based on contact theory and social transnational-
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ism literature a larger volume of cross-border practices at the individual level 
should positively affect outgroup sentiments (hypothesis 2A).
Similarly, on the country level Mewes and Mau (2013) distinguish between 
different consequences of the globalization processes which can work as a uni-
fying force or which can lead to divisions. In the former case the civilizing 
effects of globalization are realised through higher volume of transnational 
connectivity, which is argued to have a transformative effect on attitudes. 
Thus we can distinguish between contexts which provide more opportunities 
for generalised contact with others due to more developed social globalisation 
processes that increase the exposure of residents to otherness2. Globalization 
introduces previously unknown cultures to one another, which results in more 
interaction and more tolerance (Kaya and Karakoç 2012). Trust in outsiders 
is higher where the globalization (overall) is more pronounced (Norris and 
Inglehart 2009). Also the new cosmopolitanism literature sees globalization 
as a force spreading tolerance and respect of otherness (Beck 2000). Thus, it 
is expected that with an increase in social globalisation, people will tend to 
express more positive attitudes towards immigrants (hypothesis 2B).
While Mewes and Mau (2013) highlight how the effects of globalization 
are mediated by social positioning, this research builds on the fact that ef-
fects of social globalization processes are mediated by individual transna-
tionalism. Globalization is not experienced in the same way by all. Rather it 
depends on individual engagement in processes of interconnectedness. Thus 
it is expected that for individuals who do not engage in cross-border practices 
globalization processes may be seen as a threat. This leads to more negative 
sentiments about immigration originating from other EU Member States 
(hypothesis 2C).
Data and method
This study draws on the Eurobarometer dataset which is designed and coor-
dinated by the European Commission, Directorate General for Communica-
tion (European Commission and European Parliament 2015). The survey was 
initiated in 1973 and since then its main themes have concerned European 
citizenship, addressing issues such as European enlargement, the concerns of 
Europeans on national and European level, health, culture, information tech-
2  This unifying force refers to the effects of  social globalization providing increased opportuni-
ties for contact between cultures. This stands against economic globalization which can also 
bring with it negative consequences like increased competition and thus anti-immigrant senti-
ment (Kaya and Karakoc 2012).
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nology, etc. Among the topics covered by the Eurobarometer are sentiments 
towards immigrants and immigration, making it a commonly used dataset in 
the studies of attitudes towards the outgroup (Gang et al. 2013, Quillian 1995, 
Semyonov et al. 2006). Eurobarometer coverage includes the 28 European 
Union Member States, making it a particularly useful source of cross-nation-
al comparative data for academic research on attitudes. This paper adds to 
the literature employing Eurobarometer 82.3 (November 2014) for empirical 
analysis. Eurobarometer 82.3 collected 27,901 interviews with respondents 
resident in the 28 EU Member States with around 1,000 responses per coun-
try3. The interviews were conducted face-to-face in order to assure high qual-
ity data.
In order to grasp variability in attitudes not only between individuals, but 
also between countries (see also Bosker and Snijders 1999) the study utilised 
multilevel logistic regression model with mixed effects, incorporating micro 
and macro level factors. This was to account for attitudes towards intra-EU 
migration. The hypotheses tested two theoretical frameworks outlined in the 
previous section (see tab. 1).
Table 1 – Hypotheses tested
No. Hypothesis
1A
Negative feelings towards EU immigration are more likely among more vulnerable groups 
(unemployed, persons negatively assessing their individual and country economic situation, the 
less educated).
1B Individuals with strong national attachments should feel more challenged by outsiders leading to more negative feelings about immigration coming from other EU Member States.
1C
Negative feelings towards EU immigration are more likely in countries where economic competition 
is more pronounced, that is where the GDP is lower, unemployment higher, and the EU migrant 
share higher.
1D Negative sentiments towards EU immigration should be more pronounced among individuals concerned about the economic situation in vulnerable contexts.
2A High and medium volume of cross-border practices at the individual level is expected to positively affect outgroup sentiments.
2B With an increase in social globalisation people are expected to express more positive attitudes towards the EU immigration.
2C
For individuals who do not engage in cross-border practices globalization processes may be seen 
as a threat, leading to more negative sentiments to the immigration originating from other EU 
Member States.
3  In smaller countries (Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta) 500 responses were collected.
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Until very recently research on outgroup attitudes focused on immigra-
tion from non-Western origins. The Eurobarometer, for the first time, intro-
duced the question pertaining to how intra-EU immigration is perceived by 
fellow Europeans. Thus the Eurobarometer is the only available data source 
to address the issue of attitudes towards migration from within the EU. The 
exact wording of the question was the following: ‹‹Please tell me whether the 
following statement evokes a positive or negative feeling for you: Immigra-
tion of people from other EU Member States››. Possible answers included: 
very positive, fairly positive, fairly negative, very negative. The answers were 
dychotomised into 0 (fairly positive and very positive) and 1 (fairly negative 
and negative). The analysis focused on a sample of 26,145 persons declaring 
nationality of one of the 28 EU member states where they were interviewed. 
In order to test the economic threat hypothesis the individual level explan-
atory variables included referred to the socio-economic status of respondents: 
their labour market situation, the subjective concerns about individual situa-
tions4 and country situation5, social class and education.  Moreover, a dummy 
regarding identification (strong national identification versus at least some 
form of European identity) was included to test the cultural threat hypothesis. 
On the country level GDP per capita (in PPP), unemployment level and EU-
born share were included. As the economic situation may be experienced by 
individuals with some time lag, the macro variables referred to 2013. 
However the real added value of this research lies in testing the adapta-
tion of the contact theory framework in the context of European citizenship. 
Regarding contact theory, individual level variables measuring contact with 
the other were derived from the transnationalism index in Eurobarometer. 
The index variable combined information from five variables referring to in-
dividual level cross-border practices in Europe: if a person visited another 
EU country; read a book, newspaper or magazine in a language other than 
mother tongue; socialised with people from another EU country; watched TV 
programmes in a language other than mother tongue; and used the Internet 
in order to purchase a product or a service from another EU country. The 
more transnational activities a person engaged in, the higher the score on the 
transnationalism index. The index was transformed into dummies, referring 
to high and medium levels of transnationalism, leaving the low transnational 
group (which was constituted by majority of the sample) as a reference cat-
egory. At the country level contact the other was measured by the KOF social 
4  It was a dummy variable consisting of  two variables: subjective concern about personal job 
situation and financial situation of  the household. 
5  It was a dummy variable consisting of  two variables: subjective concern about the situation 
of  national economy and employment situation in the country. 
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globalization index, taking the most recent scoring of each country (2012). 
KOF social globalization index is built up taking into account a number of 
factors: data on personal contact, on information flows and cultural proxim-
ity6. Social globalization, along economic and political ones, are three dimen-
sions of the KOF index measuring the degree of globalization (Dreher 2006). 
KOF annual data are available for 207 countries for 1970 to 2012. 
Additionally, analysis controlled for a number of individual level charac-
teristics, commonly covered in attitudinal research, including gender, age, 
subjective positioning on a left-right scale and city dwelling. 
Descriptive results
Descriptive results point to cross-country variation in the attitudes to intra-
EU immigration earlier documented with studies of attitudes towards non-
Western immigrants and immigration. The range of attitudes towards the 
EU immigration is very diverse. The most welcoming was Sweden (where 
only one in six respondents declares fairly or very negative attitudes); the least 
welcoming was Latvia (with two thirds declaring negative sentiments). Two 
other Northern European countries, Finland and Denmark, seem to be wel-
coming to fellow EU citizens. Luxembourg, with a traditional multilingual 
mix, is also among destinations which remain positive about immigration 
originating from within the EU. Among new EU Member States Poland and 
Romania, recent net senders of their nationals towards Western Europe, are 
most positive towards the EU immigration. At the other extreme, a majority 
of respondents in some of the new member states – Hungary, Slovakia, Cy-
prus and Czech and Latvia – are negative about immigration from other EU 
countries. Intra-EU migration is also seen in a negative light by a majority of 
respondents in the UK and Italy.
While the descriptive results point to heterogeneity of attitudes within the 
EU both among ‘old’ and ‘new’ Member States, it is the latter that, on aver-
age, hold more negative attitudes. In ‘new’ Member States an average of 45 
per cent of respondents declare negative attitudes compared to 38 per cent in 
the ‘old’ EU. As the item pertaining to attitudes towards EU-immigration was 
6  Data on Personal Contact includes information about telephone traffic, transfers (percent of  
GDP), international tourism, foreign population (percent of  total population), international let-
ters (per capita). Data on information flows includes number of  internet users (per 1000 people), 
television (per 1000 people), trade in newspapers (percent of  GDP). Data on cultural proximity 
includes number of  McDonald’s Restaurants (per capita), number of  Ikeas (per capita), trade in 
books (percent of  GDP). 
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introduced only in 2014 it is not possible to assess how these attitudes devel-
oped across time.
While figure 1 illustrates the breakdown in negative sentiments by EU 
Member States, it remains unclear what shapes attitudes towards the intra-
EU immigration both on the individual and country levels. This is why the 
following multivariate analyses build on the literature review about group 
threat and intergroup contact in order to examine attitudinal determinants.
Figure 1 – Negative (very negative and fairly negative) attitudes towards immigration  from an-
other EU member state, percentages
Note: EB 82.3, N=26,145 weighted data (‘don’t know’ excluded)
Multivariate analyses 
A set of logistic models was run in order to test the determinants of the atti-
tudes towards immigration from other EU member states (see table 2). Firstly, 
an individual level logistic regression model was run (M1). Model 2 (M2) was 
the multilevel mixed effects logistic model adding country level variables. 
Model 3 (M3) introduced three cross-level interactions.
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Table 2 – Individual and multilevel logistic regressions with dependent variable negative attitudes 
towards immigration from other EU countries (reference group: positive)
M1 M2 M3
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Age when education completed -0.031 *** 0.003 -0.024 *** 0.003 -0.023 *** 0.003
Unemployed (ref: at work) -0.024 0.051 0.067 0.054 0.068 0.054
In education (ref: at work) -0.392 *** 0.080 -0.301 *** 0.083 -0.302 *** 0.083
Not active (ref: at work) -0.083 * 0.040 -0.078 0.042 -0.080 0.042
Negative job/household situation (ref: 
positive) 0.272 *** 0.031 0.317 *** 0.033 0.320 *** 0.033
Negative econ./empl. situation (ref: 
positive) 0.416 *** 0.038 0.610 *** 0.043 0.695 *** 0.062
Working class (ref: middle/upper class) 0.029 0.032 0.099 ** 0.034 0.100 ** 0.034
Only national identification (ref: national/
European) 0.731 *** 0.029 0.758 *** 0.031 0.759 *** 0.031
Highly transnational (ref: low) -0.479 *** 0.042 -0.562 *** 0.047 -0.554 *** 0.047
Medium transnational (ref: low) -0.218 *** 0.035 -0.283 *** 0.038 -0.281 *** 0.038
Male 0.004 0.028 0.048 0.029 0.049 0.029
Age 0.003 * 0.001 0.004 ** 0.001 0.004 *** 0.001
Right on the political scale (ref: left and 
centre) 0.235 *** 0.040 0.271 *** 0.042 0.274 *** 0.042
Undefined on the political scale (ref: left 
and centre) 0.107 ** 0.039 0.137 ** 0.042 0.139 ** 0.042
City dwellers (ref: others) -0.002 0.032 0.037 0.034 0.036 0.034
GDP per capita 2013 (centred) -0.035 0.022 -0.036 0.022
Unemployment level 2013 (centred) -0.049 * 0.021 -0.080 ** 0.025
EU born share 2013 (centred) 0.052 0.034 0.051 0.033
KOF Social Globalization Index 2012 
(centred) 0.020 0.017 0.026 0.016
Negative econ./empl. situation * 
Unemployment 0.031 * 0.015
Highly transnational * KOF -0.022 *** 0.006
Medium transnational * KOF -0.009 0.005
Constant -0.464 *** 0.092 -0.912 *** 0.140 -1.018 *** 0.145
Notes: EB 82.3, N=23,308
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001
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In the first model (M1) only individual level variables were included. In 
line with expectations derived from group threat theory (hypothesis 1A), less 
education and subjective concerns about individual economic situation and 
that of the country increase the probability of holding negative attitudes to-
wards immigration of nationals from other EU countries. Surprisingly, what 
seems to matter is not objective status (that is the state of being unemployed, 
where there is no significant effect), but how individuals subjectively assess 
their situation and the situation of their country more generally. Group threat 
theory was also corroborated in relation to threat posed by foreigners to out-
group values, culture and identities (hypothesis 1B). Strong national identifi-
cations (as opposed to holding at least to some extent European attachments) 
are positively associated with more negative sentiments. 
Moving beyond group threat frameworks, there is also very strong evi-
dence corroborating the impact of individual level transnationalism on reduc-
ing negative sentiments (hypothesis 2A). In fact, medium and high levels of 
transnationalism are strongly associated with a smaller probability of holding 
negative attitudes towards the immigration of fellow EU citizens. This sug-
gests that the contact framework can be extended in the European context 
to a set of both personal and impersonal cross-border practices. These ex-
changes provide a more generalised form of contact with fellow Europeans, 
build trust and thus reduce the sense of threat.
With regards to control variables included in the model, older age and a 
position on the right of political scale are linked to more negative sentiments.
Upon the introduction of country level variables (M2), significant effects 
remain in case of all variables (apart from non-active on the labour market). 
Also when controlling for contextual factors the effect of working class be-
comes significant in the expected direction. On the country level, however, 
hypotheses 1C and 2B do not get corroborated. A statistically significant effect 
was only found for the unemployment level, but in the direction opposite to 
that expected. This means that in countries with lower unemployment people 
are less likely to hold negative attitudes. This is a surprising result, but it was 
also found in other recent studies on migrant attitudes (Markaki and Longhi 
2013, Rustenbach 2010). No significant effects were detected  for GDP and 
size of foreign population (share of those born in the EU). This, however, is 
not limited to this study (Citrin and Sides 2008). Social globalization seems to 
fuel negative attitudes, but this effect is not statistically significant.
Finally, with the M3 model cross-level interactions were introduced. Re-
garding group threat theory (hypothesis 1D), it seems that it is subjective 
perceptions that matter more than actual threats. A statistically significant 
interaction of unemployment level with subjective concerns about negative 
situation in the economy and employment suggests that unemployment effect 
SOCIETÀMUTAMENTOPOLITICA250
matters. This effect is mediated by the judgement that the economic situation 
in the country is, indeed, negative. 
Regarding hypothesis 2C, social globalization seems to be a negative force 
driving a sense of threat. However, high levels of individual transnationalism 
become a remedy against negative feelings towards foreigners. Interestingly, 
the same does not hold for those who are at medium levels of transnational-
ism. This suggests that only with a certain volume of cross-border exchanges 
do we have attitudinal consequences which matter for how European citi-
zens see EU immigration. This finding is in line with other studies which 
document how cross-border practices matter in as much as Europeans relate 
themselves to different facets of the European integration project (Mau 2010, 
Kuhn 2015).
Conclusions
The last years have seen the emergence of an academic debate on how in-
dividual level social transnationalism affects attitudes towards Europe and 
the European integration project. This paper adds a new perspective to this 
debate, asking to what extent exercising European citizenship rights affects 
feelings towards intra-EU immigration.
Recent waves of intra-EU mobility, after the EU enlargements and mobili-
ty fuelled by the economic crisis, showed how migrations became part of a life 
strategy for increasing numbers of Europeans. Although free movement is one 
of the key rights of European citizens, it does not seem that intra-European 
mobility was positively embraced by residents of the 28 EU countries analysed 
in this paper. Why? The issue of intra-EU migration is a part of a broader 
immigration debate in an increasingly xenophobic Europe. According to the 
2015 Eurobarometer respondents in the EU Member States immigration has 
become the most important concern for Europeans. In this context the mech-
anisms at play, like economic and cultural threats posed by the outsiders to 
the ingroup, are similar to those outlined in research focusing more generally 
on immigrants and immigration. As in previous studies, it is the more vulner-
able groups who feel that they face more economic competition from foreign-
ers (persons who are worse off, those negatively assessing their individual and 
country economic situation, the less educated) and thus express more negative 
views about the immigration of fellow EU citizens. 
The impact of education, as Burns and Gimpel (2000) note in a US con-
text, may be more nuanced. More schooling may mean more training in tol-
erance, but education is also related to better socio-economic status, which, 
in turn, coincides with a reduced sense of threat. Moving beyond issues of 
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tolerance and better socio-economic standing, the better educated are also 
trained to sound politically correct. The ‘sounding right’ effect will normally 
be overlooked in a large-scale survey data, but may be detected during the 
in-depth interviewing of peers in a qualitative research setting (Byrne 2012).
Another interesting finding is that cultural threats play a role in the case of 
sentiments towards intra-EU immigration. People strongly attached to their 
national identity tend to feel that their values and culture are threatened and 
thus they do not welcome intra-EU immigration. 
There is mixed evidence of the effect of group threat theory on the contex-
tual level. From the three measures incorporated into the model – GDP per 
capita, unemployment level and share of the EU born – only unemployment 
seems to have an effect on attitudes towards immigration from the EU. With 
a negative coefficient, however, the higher the unemployment levels, the more 
positive sentiments become. This is not what was expected, but it has been de-
scribed in other recent studies (Rustenbach 2010, Markaki and Longhi 2013). 
Importantly, this effect is mediated by how people judge economic conditions 
in their country. If they are unhappy about their country’s situation, they are 
statistically significantly more likely (than those who are not) to be more nega-
tive about the immigration of fellow EU citizens. This is in line with group 
threat theory, which makes distinctions between real and perceived condi-
tions and their impact on immigration views.
The contribution of this study goes beyond testing group threat frame-
work, which has already received much empirical interest. The underlying 
question of this analysis was: to what extent processes of Europeanization 
and globalization at an individual and country level matter for sentiments 
towards immigration? The Eurobarometer data illustrates how higher levels 
of transnational practices affect attitudes. When people travel abroad and in-
teract with people from other countries, when they use media and read books 
in languages others than their mother tongue, or simply shop online within 
the EU, this amounts to more positive attitudes towards intra-EU immigra-
tion. Even if the data suggests that social globalization processes may threaten 
rather than civilise, as has been hypothesised by some, a high volume of trans-
nationalism seems to remain a remedy against prejudice. This has very strong 
implications for EU policies, which should encourage and facilitate the mobil-
ity of Europeans in building a more welcoming Europe. 
There are clearly limitations to this analysis. Firstly, only one time point 
was available for measurement which does not make it possible to examine 
how the attitudes towards fellow EU citizens changed over time. It seems plau-
sible to assume the attitudes towards the intra-EU migration have evolved in 
Western Europe in the light of the new EU enlargements, the economic crisis 
and public debate about intra-EU migration. 
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Public debate is of particular importance. Existing cross-national research on 
attitudes has not incorporated media accounts and the question of how they af-
fect the immigration attitudes. Recent media reporting presenting mass exodus 
of Europeans from crisis-struck economies towards other destinations, includ-
ing European ones, do not find strong support in empirical evidence (Recchi 
and Salamońska 2015). However, they shape public attitudes on immigration. 
Future research should acknowledge and measure how media representation of 
immigration, also intra-European one, affects views on immigration.
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